Mission Analysis Report, 15 February 45

LT SNEDEKER

E-BL-3

HEADQUARTERS
486TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

MISSION ANALYSIS REPORT

Planning

DATE:

GP MSSN NBR:

TARGET:

ALERTED AT:

BOMB LOAD REC'D AT:

WG AWO REC'D AT:

WG F/O REC'D AT:

DIV F/O REC'D AT:

ZERO HOUR:

FORCE REQUIRED:

FORCE FURNISHED BY SQUADRON (PLANNED AND ACTUAL):

	832nd	833rd	834th	835th	Total
Crews
A/C

AIR LEADER:

PARTICIPATING STAFF:
(1) (Ld-Hi Sq)
(2) (Ld-Lo Sq)
(3) (Sq Nav)
(4) (Sq Nav)
(5) (Sq Bomb)

LEAD CREWS:
(1) (Gp-Ld)
(2) (Dep Ld-lo Sq)
(3) (Gp Dep Ld, Ld-Hi Sq)
(4) (Dep Ld-Hi Sq)
(5) (Ld-Lo Sq)
(6) (Dep Ld-Lo Sq)

BRIEFING OFFICER: y

BRIEFING TIME:

BOMB BRIEFING:

NAV BRIEFING:

S-2 BRIEFING:

BOMBING ALTITUDE:

POSITION IN TASK FORCE FORM:

ESTIMATED TIME OF TAKE-OFF:

RETURN:

ASSEMBLY ALTITUDE: GP: WG: DIV:

REMARKS:

II.

EXECUTION:

TAKE-OFF: RUNWAY: WIND:
A/C TAKING OFF.:
ASSEMBLY ALTITUDE: GP: , WG: DIV

ELAPSED TIME OF ASSEMBLY:

ASSEMBLY (GP, WG & DIV):

ARRIVED 1ST PT WG ASS'Y LINE:

ARRIVED CP "A" DIV ASS'Y LINE:

POSITION IN TASK FORCE FORM:
DEPARTED CP "1":
CLIMB TO ALTITUDE (ROUTE IN):
At CP #1, reached on time and on course, the lead squadron again found it necessary to turn over the lead to the high squadron because of equipment failure (all fuses kept blowing, C-1, bombsight and rack). Therefore, the lead squadron turned short at this point and the high squadron maneuvered into lead of Group.
It was upon departing this point that climb to bombing altitude was started. by this time, planes had been able to determine position and were in fairly good formation. The route in was about as briefed, CP #2 being reached three (3) minutes late, at bombing altitude of 23,700'.

TARGET MANEUVER:
The IP of the primary target was passed about thee (3) miles to the north when it was discovered that bombing could not be done because of 10/10 undercast. This was true of the secondary as well (as both targets were to be bombed visually only), so the group selected an IP at 5155N-0710E for bombing of the last resort target. The low squadron had previously taken interval and were following in trial, but the high squadron (formerly the lead squadron), having no bombing equipment, had tacked onto the lead squadron. Bombs were away on Rheine, Germany, using PFF technique, target being completely undercast. Five (5) a/c, #453, 059, 040 006 and 009 of the high squadron, dropped early because of a premature release by an a/c (#595) of the lead squadron. Two 92) other a/c also dropped part of their bomb load at this time, but the remainder of the squadron bombed off the lead a/c of the lead squadron on the target.

TARGET ATTACKED: (LR) M/Y - Rheine, Germany

TYPE OF BOMBING: H2X Sq. Formation

TIME OF RELEASE: 1352 1/2 - 1353

NBR A/C OVER TARGET: 35 out of 38

NBR A/C ATTACKING: 35

NBR SORTIES CREDITED GP: 35

TOTAL BOMBS LOADED ON A/C TAKING OFF: 228x1000 lb. M-44

DISPOSITION OF BOMBS:

Last Resort Target:

M/Y Rheine, Germany	210x1000 lb. M-44
Total Bombs Jettisoned	12x1000 lb. M-44
Total Bombs Returned	6x1000 lb. M-44
Total Bombs Loaded on A/C T.O.	228x1000 lb. M-44

BOMBING RESULTS: Unobserved.

RALLY AND ROUTE BACK:
Rally was very good, except for being cut a little short. The squadron got together very well, losing 700' off the target. The withdrawal was approximately as briefed, group starting descent to 16,000' at 5235N-0653E. Descent to minimum altitude started at the Dutch coast, and English coast was reached at 1517 hours at 3,000'.

RETURN TO BASE: 1533-1602

PFF OPERATION:
    Three (3) PFF a/c were scheduled for today's mission. A/C #453 (M/O Foty) led "A" sq, a/c #073 (M/O Gilkey) led "B" sq and a/c 025 (M/O Anex) led "C" sq.
     (M/O Foty) Took over group lead position at CP #1. Set performed good all day. Poor H2X target but was finally picked up at fifteen (15) miles. Rates checked and good run made.
     (M/O Gilkey) Scheduled to lead group but relinquished lead to group deputy at CP #1. Bombsight, autopilot and rack malfunctions. Liaison transmitter and compass out. Mickey set worked very well all day. No contribution made to bomb run.
     (M/O Anex) Very good set with 75 to 80 mile range. Poor H2X target and could not be identified until approximately fifteen (15) miles away and was indistinct thereafter. All rates were called and last ones checked with bombsight.

WEATHER:
    Visibility was 1,00 yards in fog at take-off. There were high clouds 4-5/10 at 25,000' at assembly. 10/10 low clouds on route in from the channel at 10-20,000' with 2-4/10 clouds at 35,000'.
     Solid undercast at the target from 10-20,000. Visibility aloft was unrestricted.
     Route out was the same with low clouds breaking to 1-2/10 at the French coast. High clouds at 25,000' over the base upon return. Surface visibility was 3,000 yards.
Free air temperature at bombing altitude (23,00') was -30°C.'

COMMUNICATIONS:
Communications in general was good. No major difficulties were encountered.
VHF discipline was good.

E/A AND FIGHTER SUPPORT:
No flak or enemy a/c encountered. Fighter escort could not be contacted at the rendezvous but fighter cover was very good in the target area.

FORMATION:
On assembly, formation was poor and a/c were straggling because of lead a/c being late in reaching altitude. Squadrons assumed good position and planes flew good formation after lead change. The high flight of the lead squadron (formerly the high squadron) led by a/c #593 (Pilot - Rapp) flew far too high, putting wing a/c #859 (pilot - Melahn) into the high squadron.

ABORTIONS (INCLUDING A/C OVER TARGET AND NOT ATTACKING):

A/C NBR	SQ	REMARKS	PILOT	SORTIE
001	834	Internal failure #1 engine	Patteson	no
945	834	Bombs fell off racks (severe prop wash)	Bennett	no
311	834	Oil leak in #3 engine	Sauler	no
MALFUNCTIONS:
595	833	several bombs dropped prematurely. Reason unknown.	Rapp	yes

EVALUATION OF LEAD CREWS (BY COMMAND PILOT):

	PILOT
	McAnelly	(P), (N), (PPN), (C/O), (M/O) rated Ex. (B) rated VS. REMARKS: (P) Flew good lead. (N), (PPN) - Good navigation. (C/O) informed command pilot of all changes in formation. (M/O) Helped a lot on navigation. (B) Dropped on a/c other than lead and had early release.
	Warmack	(M/O) rated sup. (N), (PPN) rated Ex. (P), (C/O), (R/O) rated VS. REMARKS: (M/O) Excellent run and aid to navigation. (P) flying not smooth enough.
	Howard	(P), (PPN), (B), (R/O), (M/O) rated ex. (C/O) rated Sup. (N) rated VS. REMARKS: (P) Exceptionally cooperative and a smooth leader. (C/O) on the ball at all times - keeps A/L well informed.

OFFICER TAIL GUNNER REPORTS:
(pilots receiving lower than average grades and why)

PILOT	SQ	GRADE	REMARKS
Rapp	833	P	Too far back and too high
Melahn	833	P	Lagged away back.
(Outstanding performance)
Scheopner	835	Ex	Very constant position

SUGGESTIONS AND REMARKS BY OTG's:
Lead a/c are taking too long to climb to altitude. Suggest bomb load on lead a/c be reduced.

LOSSES: None.

III.

CONCLUSIONS:
     Lead a/c, with extra Mickey man, drag of scope and full bomb load, are unable to maintain a proper rate of climb or airspeed to make high altitude assemblies as the wing a/c reach altitude first and are unable to form, milling about and creating considerable confusion.
     The last resort target selected for today's bombing was unsuitable for an H2X run, because it was not identifiable until quite close, and even then was not very distinct. If it is expected, or is likely, that an H2X run will be made, a target should be chosen that is adaptable to that technique; otherwise, poor results can be expected.
     As the bombing equipment of the high squadron (formerly the lead squadron) was inoperative, it was decided to bomb while in formation with the lead squadron, off the lead a/c. However, a/c #595 (pilot - Rapp) of the lead squadron, dropped (1) bomb prematurely (malfunction) thereby causing the lead a/c (#53) of the high squadron to erroneously drop. Four (4) other a/c of the high squadron (#059, 040, 006, and 009), following the error of the lead a/c, dropped their bull bomb load. Two (2) planes (#595, and 859) dropped but part of their load, taking the rest to the target. Other planes in both formations bombed the last resort target. Again a need seems to exist for some standard manner of indicating proper time of bombs away. If crews are properly briefed that bombs are not to be dropped until announcement is made on VHF and flare is fired, such a situation as this would not be so likely to occur. Wing a/c and other planes in the formation do not know just what is going on after several targets are passed over and not bombed, because the lead a/c, looking for some suitable target of opportunity, does not notify the rest of the formation of its intention.
     The Air Leader is to be commended for his decision to turn the lead over to an a/c in proper mechanical condition, since continuing further would have jeopardized good bombing results. From all indications, the emergency was handled very well by the deputy lead that took over.

For the Commanding Officer:

James F. Gardenhire
Major, Air Corps,
Adjutant