HEADQUARTERS                       E-BLD-3

                             486TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)

                          Office of the Operationsn Officer

                               MISSION ANALYSIS REPORT

I.    PLANNING:

DATE:  4 March 1945                      GP MSSN NBR:  158.

TARGET:  (P) A/F – Neuberg, Germany.

ALERTED AT:  1930.                       BOMB LOAD REC’D AT:  2350.

WG RWO REC’D AT:  2250.                  WG F/O REC’D AT:  0235.

DIV F/O REC’D AT:  0235.                 ZERO HOUR:  0900.

FORCE REQUIRED:  One (1) group of four (4) squadrons.

FORCE FURNISHED BY SQUADRON (PLANNED AND ACTUAL):

            :   832nd      :   833rd     :   834th     :   835th     :    TOTAL   

   Crews    :   1  (1)     :  11  (12)   :  14  (15)   :  13  (14)   :  39  (42)  

   A/C      :   9  (11)    :   7  (6)    :  11  (12)   :  12  (13)   :  39  (42)  

AIR LEADER:  Capt Dimel (Group Lead).

PARTICIPATING STAFF:                           LEAD CREWS:

(1)   Lt Col DeCoursey    (Pass)                 (1)  Warmack  (Gp Ld)

(2)   Capt Simpson        (Dep Gp Ld, Ld-Hi Sq)  (2)  Cross    (Dep Ld-Ld Sq)

(3)   Lt Hodges           (Ld-Lo Lo Sq)          (3)  Raddatz  (Dep Gp Ld, Ld-Hi Sq)

(4)   Capt Boyle          (Sq Nav)               (4)  McAnelly (Dep Ld-Hi Sq)

(5)                                  Lt Aspholm             (Sq Bomb)     (5)    Beard (Ld-Lo Sq)

(6)                                  Genz                   (Dep Ld-Lo Sq)

(7)                                  Smith,W.P. (Ld-Diamond Sq)

(8)                                  Patteson               (Dep Ld-Diamond Sq)

BRIEFING OFFICER:  Major Rex, J. L.            BRIEFING TIME:  0300.

BOMB BRIEFING:  Capt McNeice.                  NAV BRIEFING:  Lt Grabow.

S-2 BRIEFING:  Lt Carlin.                                    BOMBING ALTITUDE:  20,000’.

POSITION IN TASK FORCE FORM:   4th “B” Group, (second group in Div form).

ESTIMATED TIME OF TAKE-OFF:  0530.             RETURN:  1420.

ASSEMBLY ALTITUDE:  GP  17,500’.  WG  20,000’.  DIV  20,000’.

REMARKS:

Planning of mission seemed quite poor as many changes were made before briefing, and while assembling over the continent is probably a good idea generally, and would work satisfactorily under normal conditions, weather today was very adverse, complicating a completely new system of assembling.  Continental bunchers were not investigated and did not work, thereby creating difficulty in making any assembly at all.  More advance planning should be done when a compeltely new system is inaugurated in connection with the running of a mission.

II.  EXECUTION:

     TAKE-OFF:  0531-0616.  RUNWAY:  25.  WIND  300° @ 10 MPH.

     A/C TAKING OFF:  SQ “A”  9.  SQ “B”  10.  SQ “C”  10.  SQ “D”  13.   TOTAL:  42.

     ASSEMBLY ALTITUDE:  GP  17,500’.  WG  20,000’.  DIV  20,000’.

     ELAPSED TIME OF ASSEMBLY:

Lead a/c reached assembly point over BUN at C-9 at 0703.  Assembly was completed at this point in one hour and one (1:01) minute at 17,500’.

ASSEMBLY (GP, WG & DIV):

A/C took off and proceeded direct to BUN at C-9 to assemble group at 17,500; the 94th Group (4th “A”) assemblingn over the same BUN at 20,000’.  All squadrons assembled slowly because of cirrostratus cloud conditions, dense persistent contrails and not being able to receive a radio compass reading.  The high squaderon leader could not find the formation (having proceeded incorrectly to A-72) and finally tacked on to the 100th Group, never finding the 486th Group, the high squadron deputy leader assembling and leading the squadron.  The group left the BUN on time and started climb, falling in behind 4th “A” and proceeding to Y-31, first point of wing assembly line, essing into good position.  Shortly after this point, 4th “A” Group went into sun and clouds and could not be located because of restricted visibility.  Deciding to make division assembly on time and now being about six (6) minutes early, 4th “B” started for CP #1 making a large ess, but due to a wind change, CP #1 actually was reached tghree (3) minutes late.  Division assembly was poor as 4th “B” reached CP #1 at about the same time as the wing we were to precede, but this wing turned off towards another target and there was no interfence.  The 94th Group could not be seen because of the restricted visibility.

ARRIVED 1ST PT WG ASS’Y LINE:  0827 – six (6) minutes early.

POSITION IN TASK FORCE FORM:  4th “B” Group.

DEPARTED CP “1”:  0906 – three (3) minutes late.

CLIMB TO ALTITUDE (ROUTE IN):

Climb to bombing altitude was started upon departing the assembly BUN at C-9, and bombing altitude of 20,000’ was reached at Y-31, first point of wing assembly line.  The rate of climb was below SOP being 109 feet per minute from 17,500’ to 20,000’.  The course was about as briefed except for slight deviations.  (Because of adverse weather prevailing, it was decided that the primary target could not be attacked, and group proceeded direct to secondary target.  4th “B” leader heard 4th “A” announce arrival over IP on VHF and calculated that our group was about eight (8) minutes behind the wing leader).  The Pre-IP was overshot by about three (3) miles at which point squadrons fanned out, taking good interval.

TARGET MANEUVER:

Squadrons passed over IP with wings level.  The lead squadron was making a good bomb run on H2X, but about eight (8) miles short of the secondary target, bombs were prematurely released when the radar navigator incorrectly called for bombs away when really calling his first check point.  The high squadron leader not ever having located the formation necessitated the deputy, a visual lelad a/c, to drop on the smoke bombs of the lead squadron, consequentlyly dropping short of the target also.  The low and diamond squadrons made good H2X runs on Ingolstadt from altitude of 20,000’.

TARGET ATTACKED:  (S)  Ingolstadt, Germany.

TYPE OF BOMBING:  H2X – Sq formation.          TIME OF RELEASE:  A & B – 1013½-1014

                                                                 C & D – 1021 -1022

NBR A/C OVER TARGET:  37.  OUT OF  42.

NBR A/C ATTACKING:  37.    NBR SORTIES CREDITED GP:  37.

TOTAL BOMBS LOADED ON A/C TAKING OFF:  336X 500 lb. M-43 – 168 X 500 lb. M-17.

DISPOSITION OF BOMBS:

Secondary Target:

     Ingolstadt, Germany             272 x 500 lb. M-43     136 x 500 lb. M-17

Targets of Opportunity                24 x 500 lb. M-43      12 x 500 lb. M-17

Total on All Targets                 296 x 500 lb. M-43     148 x 500 lb. M-17

Total Bombs Returned                  32 x 500 lb. M-43      16 x 500 lb. M-17

Total Bombs Jettisoned                 8 x 500 lb. M-43       4 x 500 lb. M-17

Total Bombs Loaded on A/C T.O.       336 x 500 lbs. M-43    168 x 500 lb. M-17

BOMB RESULTS:  Unobserved.

RALLY AND ROUTE BACK:

Rally was poor as lead and high squadrons dropped bombs several minutes before low and diamond and proceeded to turn off the bomb run.  Then, too, visibility was so restricted that other squadrons could hardly make visual contact.  No altitude was lost.  The high and lead squadrons flew the briefed course on withdrawal, the low an ddiamond squadrons proceeding to base individually, but in bomber stream along the planned route.  The radar equipment of the diamondn squadron was in bad shape, and the squadron drifted over moderate accurate flak in the Frieburg [sic] area.  Descent to minimum altitude was started at CP #2, just beyond the battle line, and group leveled out at 11,500’ because of cloud conditions.  The English coast was reached at 1354 ½ at 11,500’.

RETURN TO BASE AT:  1334-1443.

PFF OPERATIONS:

Four (4) PFF a/c were scheduled for today’s mission.  A/C #073 (M/O-ANEX) led “A” sq, a/c #075 (M/O-HUMPHRIES) lead “B” sq, a/c #074 (M/O-ROE) lead “C” sq and a/c #712 (M/O-O’CONNEL) led “D” sq.

(M/O-ANEX)  Set operation was good.  Group passed approximately 2 miles east of briefed IP.  10/10 cloud cover made it necessary to use H2X exclusively.  Target was located at a distance of 40 miles.  On bomb run M/O said “Let’s drop the bombs now”, intending to clear the interphones because of confusion had interefered.  Bombardier salvoed his bombes ten (10) miles short with no check points being called.”

(M/O-HUMPHRIES)  “Set operation was fair.  Signals were not strong and range limited to 40 miles.  Did not join our own group but bombed with the 100th Bomb Group.”

(M/O-ROE)  “Set performance was good.  Passed approximately 3 miles east of briefed IP.  H2X was used exclusively because of 10/10 cloud coverage.  Target was located at thirtty five (35) miles.  All bombsight adjustments were made by H2X.  Rate checks were called and last rate check was good according to bombardier.”

(M/O-O’CONNELL)  “Poor set operation.  Neither inverter would hold steady voltage, fuse blown in receiver indicator.  Poor definition an focus.  H2X used on bomb run and for all bombsight adjustments.  Rate checks called from 70° down to 62°.  Last displacement check held up.  Evidently, the rate used had been slightly fast.”

WEATHER:

Visibility at take-off was 3 miles with scattered clouds.  6-9/10 low clouds over the channel becoming 9-10/10 over the continent at 17,000’.

Layered low and middle clouds from 17-19,000’ in the target area, with 2-3/10 high clouds 25-26,000’.  Visibility was 3-5 miles in haze.  Layered warm frontal clouds broke on route out becoming 8-10/10 at 2-3,000’.  Visibility was 6 miles in light rains.

Free air temperature at bombing altitude (20,000’) was -34°C.

COMMUNICATIONS:

Communications in general was poor.  The big difficulty apparently was caused by some aicraft in the wing “keying” its VHF.  As a result, VHF communicataions were almost impossible until the formation reached the IP.  Trouble cleared somewhat after that and VHF was satisfactory.  VHF discipline was fair.

Reception on continent.  Bunchers was very poor.  It is difficult to explain the reason unless transmitters were under powered.

E/A AND FIGHTER SUPPORT:

“D” squadron encountered meager, accurate tracking flak on withdrawal over the battle line.  No enemy a/c were sighted, and support was good.

FORMATION:

Group and squadron formation was very good considering adverse weather conditions (cirrostratus clouds and dense persistent contrails).  Wing and Division formation could not be observed because of restricted visibility.

ABORTIONS (INCLUDING A/C OVER TARGET AND NOT ATTACKING):

A/C NBR       SQ               REMARKS                  PILOT          SORTIE

477 SP        832  Returned due to weather.             COOPER         No

942 SP        832  Personnel error.                     GIBBS          No

902 SP        832  #1 engine failure                    BUNN           No

970 SP        832  Returned due to weather              PANKOW         No

787 SP        835  Returned due to weather              WALKUP         No

MALFUNCTIONS:  None

EVALUATIOPN OF LEAD CREWS (BY COMMAND PILOTS):

PILOT

RADDATZ:     (P) rated VS, (E), (PPN), (B), (C/O), (R/O), (M/O) rated S.

             REMARKS:  (N) had wrong coordinates.

WARMACK:     (P), (C/O), rated EX, (B) rated VS, (N) rated S, (M/O) rated P.

             REMARKS:  (M/O) personnel error on premature release.

SMITH,W.P.   Entire crew reated VS.  REMARKS:  (P) could be smoother.

OFFICER TAIL GUNNER REPORTS:

     (Pilots receiving lower than average grades and why).

PILOT         SQ      GRADE                  REMARKS

DELAPLAINE    833       F            Straggles.

   (Outstanding performances)

PATTESON      834     EX             Flew well forward and stacked up.

CROSS         835     EX             Excellent formation.

BEDARD        835     EX             Excellent position.

SUGGESTIONS AND REMARKS BY OTG’s:  None.

LOSSES:  None.

III.   CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

Considering the poor planning of today’s mission, the execution was very good.  A new system of assembling groups over a BUN on the continent was inaugurated, but unfortunately prevailing weather was very adverse, cirrosttratus clouds and dense persistent contrails restricting visibility and making formation flying hazardous.  BUN reception was extremely poor, there being but a weak return at best, most a/c not being able to pick up any directional indication.  It would seem that when a major change is made in the construction of a mission, close investigation should be made of all the factors involved in the attempt to elimninate any unnecessary difficulty.  Field orders and timings came in very late, preventing a proper briefing of combat crews concerning the new assembly.  This manner of assembly will probabaly be quite satisfactory under normal circumstances, as there will be a definite decrease in gasoline consumption.

A more thorough investigation of the premature bomb release by the lead a/c of the 486th “A” Squadron was conducted and the following facts, all contributing to the error revealed:

1.   The radar navigator was flying his first mission with this particular crew.

2.  This mission was rushed to such an extend that crew, especially M/O and bomb (never having flown together), did not have time to set up and discuss a procedure that would be familiar to both under which they could operate.  Smooth coordinate between M/O and bomb usually gained through actual application is most necessary, especially on an H2X bomb run where these two must work together to successfully get bombs away on the target.

3.  After careful investigation, it was established that the radar navigator could very easily have been showing effects of flying fatigue; he having flown the past six out of seven days.  Under ordinary conditions, this almost continuous stretch of flying ops missions for one man would never have occurred but it was found necessary in an attempt to bring about better results in the all out efforts of the continuous bombing days set up by higher headquarters.

4.  The radar navigators interphone system was not functioning too well, and in an attempt to clear up the interphone ane get everything set for a good run, he supposedly remarked, “let’s get bombs away now.”  The bombardier hesitated because he could see smoke bomb of other groups way ahead.  The pin point navigator repeated “bombs away”, and then PPN and M/O came on interphone, both, in the opinion of other crew members and the bombardier, calling for “bombs away.”  Bombs were then released, and the radar navigator came in with the “dropped early” message.

All a/c of “A” squadron dropped on the early release of the lead a/c, and “B” squadron dropped on “A”’a smoke bombs, because the high lead PFF a/c had not joined formation at assembly point.  This is explained as an oversight on the part of the navigator in using coordinates of A-72 instead of C-9.  These fields were both listed on the communications flimsy in analogous positions because of having the same radio BUN freuqncey.  However, only the coordinates of A-72 were entered, and the navigator mistakingly used them instead of the C-9 coordinates which were entered on the navigators flight plan.

                 For the Commanding Officer:

JAMES F. GARDENHIRE

Major, Air Corps.

Adjutant.

FLIMSY