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CAPT HOWE BOMBING OFFICER HEADQUARTERS 486TH BOMBARDMENT
GROUP (H) Office of the
Operations Officer MISSION ANALYSIS
REPORT I. PLANNING: DATE: 9 March
1945 GP
MSSN NBR: 161 TARGET:
(P) M/Y – Frankfurt, Germany. ALERTED AT:
1830 BOMB
LOAD REC’D AT: 2045 WG AWO REC’D AT:
2205 WG F/O REC’D AT: 0445 DIV F/O REC’D AT:
0100 ZERO
HOUR: 0800 FORCE REQUIRED:
One (1) group of four (4) squadrons plus chaff force – 3 A/C. FORCE FURNISHED BY
SQUADRON (PLANNED AND ACTUAL):
AIR LEADER:
CAPT Whitney (Group Lead).
BRIEFING OFFICER: CAPT Miller BRIEFING TIME: 0300 BOMB BRIEFING: LT Aspholm NAV BRIEFING: MAJ Skipp S-2 BRIEFING: LT Carlin BOMBING
ALTITUDE: 23,000’ POSITION IN THE TAKS FORCE FORM:
4th “C” Group (third group in Div formation). ESTIMATED TIME OF TAKE-OFF:
0610 RETURN: 1317 ASSEMBLY ALTITUDE: GP 6,000’
WG: 6,000’ DIV: 6,000’ II. EXECUTION: TAKE-OFF:
0600-0716 RUNWAY: 25
WIND 320° @ 7 MPH A/C TAKING OFF: SQ “A” 10
SQ “B” 10 SQ “C” 10 SQ “D” 10 CHAFF
FORCE 3 TOTAL 43 ASSEMBLY ALTITUDE:
GP 6,000’ WG 6,000’ DIV 7,000’ ELAPSED TIME ASSEMBLY One hour and
twenty three (1:23) minutes from time of take-off. Lead a/c reached assembly
(6, 000’) at 0627 and group was formed at 0723. ASSEMBLY
(GP. WG & DIV): Group assembly at 6,000'
was quite slow because of darkness, but, by the time BUN #22 was departed,
planes had assumed good positions. BUN #22 was left two (2) minutes early, causing congestion as other groups
in wing were also early
at first point of wing assembly line, BUN #16. 4C (486) did quite a bit of essing at this
point, and enroute to BUN #23, group was considerably north of course establishing
interval. BUN #23 was
passed six (6) miles to the south in the completion of the wing assembly maneuver, and by
CP #l (arrived at on time) group had assumed good position in the wing. ARRIVED
1ST PT WG ASS’Y LINE: 0735 - On time. POSITION IN TASK FORCE
FORM: 4th “C”
group (third group in Div formation). DEPARTED CP “1”:
0750 – on time. CLIMB TO ALTITUDE (ROUTE
IN): Climb to bombing altitude
started at 0744, as briefed. The route
in was well flown and about as briefed without much essing. At the Pre-IP, squadrons fanned out and took
good interval. Before the IP was
reached, the lead a/c of the lead squadron called the deputy lead (#2
a/c) and informed him that if it was a visual run; he would have to take over,
as the lead bombardier could not erect gyros of bombsight stabilizer. If the
run was to be H2X, lead could continue, equipment operating satisfactorily. The
rate of climb to 15,000' was 186’/min, and from 15,000' to 23,000' the climb
was a bit in excess of SOP being 170'/min. TARGET
MANEUVERING: Group
cut the IP short and passed about five (5) miles to the
south of the briefed
IP, in trail, with wings level, and the lead called for a visual run. The
deputy lead a/c pulled into position as lead of lead squadron, the lead a/c
flying echeloned on left wing. Most of .run to target was 9/10’s
undercast, but about one (1) to two (2) minutes synchronization was possible as
target itself was in the clear. All squadrons bombed the primary target
visually. TARGET ATTACKED: (p) M/Y - Frankfurt, Germany. TYPE OF BOMBING: Visual (sq formation). TIME OF RELEASE: 0959-1000 1/2 NBR
A/C OVER TARGET: 43
OUT OF 43. NBR
A/C ATTACKING: 43. NBR
SORTIES CREDITED GP: 43. TOTAL BOMBS LOADED ON A/C
TAKING OFF: 1680
X 100 lb. M-30 & 80 X 500 lb. M-17. DISPOSITION OF BOMBS: Primary
Target: M/Y - Frankfurt,
Germany: 1661 X 100 lb. M-30 79 X 500 lb. M-17 Total Bombs Jettisoned: 18 X 100 lb. M-30 1 X 500 lb. M-17 Total Bombs Returned: 1 X 100 lb. M-30 _______________
Total Bombs Loaded on A/C T.O. 1680 X 100 lb. M-30 80 X 500 lb. M-17 BOMBING
RESULTS: "A"
and "D” squadrons dropped a composite pattern of semicircular shape which
is approximately 1000' short, left and over the assigned MPI. This pattern is
approximately 5000' in length. There are at least 15 hits on the M/Y. "B"
squadron dropped a compact pattern approximately 3000’ right and 1500'
short of the MPI. Two or three bombs of this pattern are on the right end of
the M/Y. There
was no definite photographic coverage for "C" squadron. A fourth pattern
which probably belongs to this squadron is in a residential area approximately
5000' right of the assigned MPI. RALLY AND ROUTE BACK: After bombs away, the
lead a/c again resumed lead of the group and made good rally, diamond being a
little slow in getting together with other squadrons. Group lost 1,000' off the
target. The withdrawal was as planned, route and descents being made as
briefed. The English coast was reached at 1230 1/2 hours at 8,500', entry being
made at Beachy Head, per instructions. In the vicinity of London, let down to
minimum altitude wa.s started. RETURN
TO BASE AT: 1311-1340. PFF
OPERATIONS: Four
(4) PFF a/c were scheduled for today's mission. A/C #073 (R/N..YEP) led “A” sq, a/c
#132 (R/N-TOLLIVER) led “B" sq, a/c #074 (R/N-BOPP) led "C" sq,
a/c #712 (R/N-WALTER) led “D" sq. (R/N-YEP)
"Set operation was
fair. Hose from pressure unit became disconnected causing excessive
interference. No check points were called. Deputy lead took over on visual
target because of bombsight malfunction." (R/N-TOLLIVER)
"Set operation was good. Only first check point was called, as no other
were needed. M-H equipment operated satisfactorily except for exessive
interference." . (R/N-BOPP)
"Set operation was very good. Bombardier had visual target, so R/N
followed through on check points. M-H equipment operated satisfactorily except
that the Namur beacon was weak and intermittent.” (R/N
WALTER) “Set operation was good. No
check points called because Bombardier made visual run. Beacon performance was satisfactory except
that the Namur beacon could not be held in scope because return was very
weak. Suspect ground station trouble. WEATHER: The
weather was clear at take-off with visibility 4 miles. Route across the channel was 1-3/10 low
clouds with tops 3-4,000’, becoming 6-9/10 over the continent. Target area was 6-9/10 low clouds at
4-5,000’ with unrestricted visibility aloft. Route
out was 4-6/10 low clouds to Rhine river and gradually diminishing to 1-3/10 low clouds over the channel. Base on return was 1/10 cumulus at
3,000’ to 3,500'. Visibility was 10
miles. Free
air temperature at bombing altitude (23,000') was -26°C. COMMUNICA
TIONS: VHF discipline within the
group was very good on today’s mission but the 487th Group was constantly
“hogging” the net with
incessant and unnecessary chatter. E/A
AND FIGHTER SUPPORT: Meager
to moderate tracking type flak encountered in the target area. No enomy a/c were
sighted, and fighter support was excellent. FORMATION: Group and squadrons’
formation was very good. Wing formation was good, proper intervals being
maintained. ABORTION_( INCLUDING A/C
OVER TARGET AND NOT ATTACKING): A/C NBR SQ REMARKS PILOT SORTIE 074 833 Over the target but not bombing. RYGIEL Yes (See
conclusions for full coverage.) MALFUNCTIONS: 894 832 Attacked target. Dropped 8 X
100 lb. SEABURG Yes bombs and 1 X
500 lb. bomb manually at
5015N-0925E because of faulty A-4 release at "bombs away" time. 996 834 Attacked target. One (1) bomb jammed
BRANDSTEIN Yes causing
nine (9) others to hang up. Bombs were jettisoned at Southwold. 899 835 Attacked target. One (1)
bomb returned WALKUP Yes because
of faulty A-4 release. EVALUATION OF LEAD CREWS (BY COMMAND PILOTS): GIBSON: Entire crew rated EX. No remarks made. DIBBLE: Entire crew rated EX. REMARKS: (P) --
quicker throttle changes will help him hold position. (B) - as good as I
have seen on target identification. (C/O) - doesn't
volunteer enough information. OGLE: P, R/N rated SUP, N, PPN, B, rated
EX. C/O and R/O rated VS. REMARKS:
(P) - very smooth lead. (N) - worked well with Mickey Operator. (PPN) - picked us up when possible. (R/N) - good work. OFFICER
TAIL GUNNER REPORTS: (Pilots
receiving lower than average grades and why). PILOT SQ GRADE REMARKS None (Outstanding
performances) EWNGFORD 832 EX Held a tight constant position. HUNTER 832 EX Held a good position. ESTERSOHN 833 EX Good position. DAUENHAUER 834 EX Held a perfect
position. WEST 834 EX Very good element lead. CROSS 834 EX Held a perfect
position. ELLERSICK 835 EX Good element
lead. CHILTON 835 EX Held a good
position. SILL 835 EX Held a constant
position. SUGGESTIONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS: None. LOSSES: None. III. CONCLUSIONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS: Questions
have been raised from time to ttime concerning the pilots atitude toward the
new type of formation, from ease of flying generally, and ability to keep good
group and squadron formations on combat missions as precautionary measures
against enemy fighter attacks. It seems
to be the concensus of opinion among most pilots (first, command, and lead)
that the four (4) squadron formation of nine (9) or ten (10) a/c, without the high element, is
definitely superior
to the old thirteen (13) plane squadron. The new formation is more adaptable
to better formation flying, both for planes within the squadron, and for
squadrons within the group. The latter, particularly is important, as squadrons
can be handled quite easily, having all planes in trail, and positions can be
flown as desired, perhaps even to the extent of intermingling squadrons, as the
lead a/c can fly his squadron almost as an element because of the greater flexibility.
The bomb pattern should be greatly improved in the future as individual a/c
should be able to really rack it in close on the run if they are made to feel
the great necessity for particularly good flying on the bomb run, probably even drawing excessive power to keep it in close.
Certainly, all the work and time put in on a mission is wasted, and the long
hours of formation flying for naught, if for the few minutes on the bomb run and over the target, superior
formation is not flown. Regardless of the type formation flown on the route in
and on the withdrawal; if poor formation is flown on the bomb run, the formation for the
day is poor! If pilots are properly impressed with the
extreme importance of tight formation on the run, most of the difficulty will
be eliminated, for most of them are conscientious persons desiring to
accomplish the best job possible. If
the matter is properly presented, and the extreme importance of the few minutes
over the target made apparent, better formation can be expected. On today's control officer's
reports, there were no “lower than average" grades, but such remarks as
"little too far out”, “not constant”, "varied position" and
"hung back" were common. From all indications, the formations
generally were good, but improvement is still desired. Peel
off procedure has
greatly improved under the new method of formation, as two squadrons can peel
off within a short time of one another. The diamond and low squadrons
can be peeled off on the first pass over the field, as the diamond squadron peels off as soon as
the BUN is passed (squadron peeling from #3 a/c of lead element, #1 then #2, trailing elements
following). The low squadron makes a tight 360° turn and comes back over BUN, and
can peel his nine (9) or ten (10) a/c off while the lead and high squadrons are still
making their larger circle. The lead
squadron can then approach the field on the second pass and peel off, the high
making a tight 360° turn and following the lead. This is accomplished in a minimum
of time and is a definite improvement over previous methods. The diamond squadron has
been over run by following groups on the bomb run the past several missions,
either because our own squadrons are taking too great an interval, forcing the
diamond back, or the succeeding groups are not keeping good group
interval. In any event, the squadron
has “sweated out” collision courses with the lead squadron of the following
group. The matter has been presented to wing,
stressing the importance of groups maintaining the three (3) minute interval between groups in the
wing, for by the time four (4) squadrons in each group fan out, the interval is
filled. A/c #074 (Pilot-RYGIEL),
the lead a/c of the low squadron, returned bombs to base. The smoke bomb released, however, permitting the balance of the squadron
to attack. Reason for failure - unknown, but believed to have been
personnel error on part of one of the crew members in not turning on
rack switches in bomb bay. For thirty-six (36) hours, the fact that
this a/c did not bomb wass unknown by persons (including this section)
supposedly responsible for gathering such data, reasons for failure, etc.
Reason for failure is still unknown, as the crew is on pass. No mention of the
fact was made at interrogation or critique by the bombardier or other crew
members that bombs were returned, reasons therefore or what have you - except on the tail gunner report which
was overlooked. All bombardiers are responsible for reporting disposition
of all bombs to the bombardier interrogation, and this bombardier (KANE) evidently reported bombs on the
target or at least made no mention otherwise.
All reports were submitted showing the a/c as attacking and have had to
be rescinded. This is not important,
however, It is important, though, that the reason for failure to get those bombs on the target be
known and corrective
action taken. A/C
#’s 928 (WEBBER) and
#894 (SEABURG) were reported as dropping bombs late – no apparent reason for #928. A/C #894 was
reported to have had a faulty A-4 release, releasing some bombs after target. Whether this caused the late drop at the target is not known. The mission was well
executed, but despite visual conditions, bombing results generally were only
fair. The bomb patterns were well
spread out indicating straggling squadron formations. Definite improvement can and should be
expected. In fact, some inquiry should probably be made to ascertain the
exact reasons for the poor bombing performances, as the weather should continue
to improve and the group should certainly be able to expect better results from
visual runs. Perhaps bombardiers are putting too much reliance in the radar navigator's ability to guide
them in and kill rate and course.
The lead squadron had good results, and other squadrons should have done
at least a fair job. Granted the
bombardier has all his work in a few rushed moments, while the pilots and
navigators may iron
out any difficulties over a period of time, but better bombing results
should be obtained on
a visual. Finding the answer to better visual bombing
will probably be a job, but
every effort should be made in that directlon, and now! For the Commanding
Officer: [signature] James F. Gardenshire, Major, Air Coprs, Adjutant
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