Mission Analysis Report, 3 March 45

LT SNEDEKER

E-BL-3

HEADQUARTERS
486TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer

MISSION ANALYSIS REPORT

Planning

DATE: 3 MARCH 45

GP MSSN NBR: 157

TARGET: (P) Brunswick, Germany

ALERTED AT: 1840

BOMB LOAD REC'D AT: 2345

WG AWO REC'D AT: 2240

WG F/O REC'D AT: 0400

DIV F/O REC'D AT: 0210

ZERO HOUR: 0800

FORCE REQUIRED: One (1) group of four (4) squadrons

FORCE FURNISHED BY SQUADRON (PLANNED AND ACTUAL):

	832nd	833rd	834th	835th	Total
Crews	12 (13)	12 (11)	14 (15)	1 (1)	39 (40)
A/C	9 (10)	7 (7)	10 (11)	13 (12)	39 (40)

AIR LEADER: Lt Col Uhle (Wing Lead)

PARTICIPATING STAFF:
(1) Capt Walker (Gp Dep Ld)
(2) Lt Heckersen (Ld-Hi Sq)
(3) Lt Eckenroth (Ld-Lo Sq)
(4) Lt Hodges (Ld-Lo Lo Sq)
(5) Capt Boyle (Sq Nav)

LEAD CREWS:
(1) McAnelly (Gp-Ld)
(2) Howard (Dep Gp Ld)
(3) Beard (Ld-Hi Sq)
(4) Rygiel (Dep Ld-Hi Sq)
(5) Smith,W.P.. (Ld-Lo Sq)
(6) Ozier (Dep Ld-Lo Sq)
(7) Raddatz (Ld-Lo Lo Sq)
(8) Hunter (Dep Ld-Lo Lo Sq)

BRIEFING OFFICER: Capt Whitney

BRIEFING TIME: 0330

BOMB BRIEFING: Lt Douglas

NAV BRIEFING: Lt Maurer

S-2 BRIEFING: Maj Morriss

BOMBING ALTITUDE: 25,000'

POSITION IN TASK FORCE FORM: 4th "A" Group (Fourth group in Div formation)

ESTIMATED TIME OF TAKE-OFF: 0630

RETURN: 1320

ASSEMBLY ALTITUDE: GP: 8,000' WG: 8,000' DIV: 8,000'

REMARKS:

Planning on second task force was poor, causing interference on climb over channel, for although this force was to be 2,000' below us and eight (8) minutes ahead in timing, groups were hopelessly intermingled when climb apparently was started early causing forces to be about in the same positions.

II.

EXECUTION:

TAKE-OFF: 0645-0718 RUNWAY: 25 WIND: 330° @ 15 MPH
A/C TAKING OFF.: SQ "A" 9 SQ "B" 10 SQ "C" 10 SQ "D" 11 TOTAL 40
ASSEMBLY ALTITUDE: GP: 10,000', WG: 10,000' DIV: 10,000'

ELAPSED TIME OF ASSEMBLY: On (1) hour from time of take-off. Lead a/c reached assembly altitude (10,000') at 0745 (after late take off) and assumed lead.

ASSEMBLY (GP, WG & DIV):

Group assembly was fair as wing leader blew a tire at the end of runway before take-off and not only delayed take-off generally, but was last plane to take-off, falling into position just in time to take over and make wing assembly. (The general formation of the new type of group of (4) squadrons was very good). Because of being slightly late, BUN 13 was cut short by about two (2) miles to the right, (1) minute, and wing assembly was made. Meanwhile, assembly altitude had been raised from 9,000' to 10,800' by the division leader for some reason, which further slowed the wing down, as stronger headwinds were encountered at the higher altitude. Recognizing this fact, wing leader skipped the second point of wing assembly at Halsworth, and proceeded direct to CP #1. However, wing was still late by two (2) minutes at CP #1, and division assembly was poor at this point, as the preceding wing could just be seen, interval being too great.

ARRIVED 1ST PT WG ASS'Y LINE: 0751 - one minute late.

POSITION IN TASK FORCE FORM: 4th "A" Group (fourth (4th) group in Div formation).
DEPARTED CP "1": 0813 - two (2) minutes late.
CLIMB TO ALTITUDE (ROUTE IN):
Climb to bombing altitude of 25,000' started at CP #1. Over the channel, the second task force, for reasons unknown, (unless planning was poor), although presumably 2,000' below us and eight (8) minutes ahead in timings, apparently started climbing before we did, causing a congestion and complete intermingling of groups of the two task forces. It wasn't until task force "2" leveled off at 20,000' that 4th Wing was able to discern rest of Division ahead. Wing leader then asked Division leader to ess and wing was closed up quite well until 4th Wing had to ess to close up groups in the wing. The route in was as briefed, navigation being excellent. Bombing altitude was reached at CP #2, rate of climb being approximately SOP of 230 feet per minute to 15,000' and 130 feet per minute from 15,000' to 25,000'. At Pre-IP, squadrons fanned out and took good interval.

TARGET MANEUVER:
Kodak Red at first advised attacking the secondary target, as an overcast existed by later, as wing approached IP, informed the wing leader that a visual run could be made, and 4th "A" acted on that basis, proceeding directly over the briefed IP with wings level. At about this time the Mickey equipment of the lead a/c of the lead squadron became inoperative. Although the IP and route in to target was CAVU, the target itself was overcast by about 6-8/10's clouds and the bombardiers could not definitely pick up the primary MPI. The lead squadron selected another MPI of marshalling yard very near the primary target, synchronized on it, and dropped bombs. The low and diamond squadrons, although not definitely being able to see the assigned MPI, lined up by means of visual check points and attempted to bomb the primary target. The high squadron did not drop at this time, but proceeded along with group and bombed the last resort target of Herford (5207N-0840E) visually, PFF equipment being inoperative, again joining the group after bombing.

TARGET ATTACKED: (P) M/Y and Factory - Brunswick, Germany.
(LRT) M/Y - Herford, Germany.

TYPE OF BOMBING: Visual, sq. formation

TIME OF RELEASE: "A", "B" & "D" 1025 1/2-1026 1/2, "C" 1114

NBR A/C OVER TARGET: 38 out of 40

NBR A/C ATTACKING: 38

NBR SORTIES CREDITED GP: 39

TOTAL BOMBS LOADED ON A/C TAKING OFF: 280 x500 lb. M-43 & 240x500 lb. M-17

DISPOSITION OF BOMBS:

Primary Target: Armament Factory, Brunswick, GR	70x500 lb. M-43	40x500 lb. M-17
Primary Target (selected MPI): M/Y, Brunswick, Germany	123x500 lb M-43	108x500 lb. M-17
Last resort Target: M/Y, Herford, Germany	70x500 lb. M-43	60x500 lb. M-17
Total on All Targets:	263x500 lb. M-43	228x500 lb. M-17
Total Bombs Jettisoned	17x500 lb M-43	12x500lb. M-17
Total Bombs Loaded on A/C T.O.	280x500 lb. M-43	240x500 lb. M-17

BOMBING RESULTS: .

"A" sqs dropped a loose pattern in a residential area and across the choke point at the west end of the M/Y. Three of four of these bombs fell on the choke point. This pattern is approximately 4000' left and 1200' over the assigned MPI.

"B" sq dropped a fairly compact pattern in a residential and shopping area., approximately 2500' short and 800' left of the center of the M/Y at Hereford, Germany. None of the bombs fell in the M/Y.

"C" sq dropped a long pattern 1000' left and 1200' short of the MPI. Many of the bombs fell on a siding, probably causing considerable damage. No bombs are believed to have fallen in the target area.

"D" sq dropped a fairly compact pattern in a residential and shopping area, about 2500' short and 800' left of the center of the M/Y at Herford. none of the bombs fell on the M/Y.

RALLY AND ROUTE BACK:
An excellent rally was made, squadrons getting together well and losing 1000' after the RP, wing leader relinquished lead to deputy, because radar equipment was inoperative in lead a/c, thereby not being available for navigational assistance through flak corridors. The route out was substantially as briefed, route being flown very well and descents were made as briefed. Around the Dummer Lake area, 4th "A" Group was almost forced over flak areas because of interference from other groups. Descent to minimum altitude was started at CP #3, and the English coast was reached at 1311 hours at 7,000'

RETURN TO BASE: 1303-1406

PFF OPERATION:
     Five (5) PFF a/c were scheduled for today's mission. A/C #025 (M/O BOPP-Nav, GILKEY-Bomb) lead "A" sq. A/C #074 (M/O ANEX) dep lead "A" sq. A/C #453 (M/O ROE) led "B" sq. A/C #075 (M/O O'CONNELL) led "C" sq. A/C #035 (M/O HUMPHRIES) led "D" sq.
     (M/O BOPP-Nav, GILKEY-Bomb) Excellent performance of set until just prior to IP, when it went out completely. Run was made visually.
     (M/O ANEX) Set performance was good. Took over group lead after visual bomb run.
     (M/O ROE) Set performance was fair except for excessive interference. Could not make satisfactory sighting because of spoking and back lash on H2X. Run on last resort was made visually.
     (M/O O'CONNELL) Malfunction occurred over England. Set completely inoperative. bomb run was entirely visual.
     (M/O HUMPHRIES) Operation of se was very good although some difficulty was experienced. Visual run made.

WEATHER:
    3 mile visibility in clear weather at take-ff. 6-10/10 low clouds from 6-7,000' along English cost becoming 6-8/10 in mid-channel, continuing to enemy coast. Visibility was unrestricted.
     5/10 low clouds in target at 9,000' with unrestricted visibility. Route out the same as route in except 3-5/10 low clouds over England.
     Base on return was 4/10 cumulus from 2500' to 5000'. Eight (8) miles visibility.
     Free air temperature at bombing altitude 925,000') was -34°C.

COMMUNICATIONS:
Communications on this mission was EX. No major difficulties were encountered.
VHF discipline was excellent. All contacts were made satisfactorily. Considerable enemy jamming was encountered on 3rd AD ground station frequency.

E/A AND FIGHTER SUPPORT:
Meager, accurate barrage and tracking type flak was encountered in the target area. No enemy a/c were encountered and fighter support was good.

FORMATION:
Group formation was excellent, the four (4) squadron formation working quite well. Fair to good formation was flown within the wing. Division formation was poor as interval could not be closed.

ABORTIONS (INCLUDING A/C OVER TARGET AND NOT ATTACKING):

A/C NBR	SQ	REMARKS	PILOT	SORTIE
010 (SP)	834	Cracked duct in #3 engine.	BAY	No
246 (SP)	835	Internal failure #4 engine.	CASEY	Yes

MALFUNCTIONS: None.

EVALUATION OF LEAD CREWS (BY COMMAND PILOT):

	PILOT
	HOWARD	(N), (C/O), (R/O), (M/O) rated VS, (P) rated S. REMARKS: (P) slow in checking plane before stations. (N) would have been late at wing assembly.
	SMITH,W.P.	[unreadable]
	BEARD	(P), (PPN) rated SUP. (C/O), (R/O), (M/O) rated EX. (N) rated VS. (B) rated S. REMARKS: (P) held good position, seems to have missed the beat in coordinating the crew. (N), (PPN), is outstanding DR with no equipment aides. (P) doesn't follow instructions. (R/O) must not be criticized for command pilot's mistakes in strike report.

OFFICER TAIL GUNNER REPORTS:
(pilots receiving lower than average grades and why)

PILOT	SQ	GRADE	REMARKS
None.
(Outstanding performance)
WOOD	832	EX	In there all the time.
SANTA ANNA	832	EX	Excellent lead.
HOWARD	833	EX	Steady, smooth position.
HUNTER	833	EX	Very smooth and steady.
OZIER	834	EX	Good close position throughout flight.
DAUENHAUER	834	EX	Good close position throughout flight.

SUGGESTIONS AND REMARKS BY OTG's:
Too long to form. Element leaders didn't show up soon enough. Poor peel-off. Jumbled mess.
Suggest lead ships (in sq run) notify a/c of changes in altitude.

LOSSES: None.

III.

CONCLUSIONS:

     Today's mission was well executed. Navigation was excellent, and although wing leader encountered numerous complications during take-off and assembly, a very good wing leas was flown. Bombing was attempted visually, after being advised by Kodak that visual conditions prevailed, but was the target was about 6-8/10's covered, the assigned MPI could not be picked up. Consequently, an MPI was selected on a nearby M/Y, by the lead squadron, and bombs dropped on that target. The low and diamond squadrons attempted to bomb the primary target by means of visual pin points on the run. The high squadron did not drop, but proceeded along route out., bombing visually, a last resort target at Herford. Results on all targets were poor to fair.
     It has been recommended to wing and Division that a bombing range be provided for practice bombing through broken clouds conditions, as present practice ranges are not allowed to be bombed unless entirely visual. Bombardiers are not getting needed practice on dropping blue bombs when weather is slightly adverse and cannot properly handle actual situations arising over the target. This will be especially desirable with the advent of better weather and targets mostly visual, but perhaps complicated by some cloud condition. Today's mission was apparently not particularly bombardier error but rather an insufficiency on the part of the bombardier in not being able to exactly handle the situation existant over the target. More blue bombs dropped under all condition should be the answer to that crying need for better bombing results
     The new formation being flown consisting of four (4) squadrons (lead, high, low and diamond) worked very satisfactorily. Assembly was good among squadrons but the low squadron experienced prop wash during assembly, when the two and three elements of the lead squadron flew down and back. it is recommended that the wing men of the lead element of all squadrons fly staked up, the low element fly level, and the low-low element fly stacked slightly down. Good interval was taken at the Pre-IP and no difficulties were encountered on the bomb run except for severe prop wash, which probably can be substantially eliminated by better formation flying by element leads and wing a/c in the preceding prescribed manner.
     Turrets were reported as not being manned today in quite a few a/c, despite the fact that is was announced that bandits were in the area. Although the new type of formation should be quite good defensively, for tight group formation can be maintained, the high element is lacking, and planes of the lead element of each squadron will now be forced to search forward. There is, of course, more chance of having a straggler squadron, which is particularly good prey for enemy fighters, so good formation will be necessary on the part of all a/c to enable squadrons to fly closer. Elements or wing men lagging, will force squadrons out of position.
     Crew assignments should be closely checked when any substitution of staff or squadron personnel is made. Today, the high squadron lead a/c had tow (2) pin point navigators assigned to it, but no DR navigator. Consequently, neither had geo charts or other proper equipment to handle the job of DR navigation, but an outstanding job was done, notwithstanding the lack of instrument aids. Such good fortune is not likely to always be the case however, then dependence may be put in the ability of the high squadrons, deputy leader of the group, to accurately navigate through flak corridors or fly some definite courses. This is also true of any squadron, becoming separated from the group, of necessity relying on its own navigation for a safe return to base.

For the Commanding Officer:

James F. Gardenhire
Major, Air Corps,
Adjutant

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