486th Bombardment Group (H) - Aircraft Accident Report 3 February 1945 (A/C 43-38031)

On 3 February 1945, a/c #43-38031 (pilot - 1st. Lt. Lewis K. Cloud) was returning from an operational mission and had reached the coast of England. Some of the crew (E, R/O, WG, BG, and TG) had congregated in the radio compartment forward of the ball turret. Suddenly the engineer noticed a fire directly behind the ball turret. He immediately went forward to inform the pilot of the fire, obtained a fire extinguisher from the top turret position, returned to the radio room and handed the extinguisher to a member of the crew (the ball gunner), informing him that he did not think it would do any good to try to put the fire out. The fire had by that time evidently reached a point where it was out of control. It seemed that the wooden floor was ablaze for quite a distance back. The pilot had turned the a/c gradually out of the squadron formation in which he was flying and then turned the controls over to the co-pilot in order to get down to the flight deck to look at the extent of the fire. By this time, the engineer had notified the navigator and bombardier of the fire and intentions of having to abandon ship. After seeing the extent of the fire, the pilot returned to the pilot's seat and told the co-pilot to get out of the a/c. The engineer was the first to leave the a/c, followed by the navigator, bombardier and co-pilot. One man, the ball turret gunner, got out of the a/c but his chute did not open soon enough, evidently because the a/c was too close to the ground when he jumped. The a/c was seen to go into a steep turn and crash to the ground, explode and burn. No occupants other than those listed above escaped from the a/c. Four (4) men (P, R/O, WG, & TG) were still in the a/c when it crashed.

The following facts were derived from the investigation and board meetings:

1. That the fire must be attributed to the cause set forth in the engineer's statement since he is the only person that escaped that saw the fire close enough to have knowledge of the exact location and a possible cause thereof. It is very feasible that the fire did start from this source (see engineer's statement) and even more possible that the fire was being fed from a broken oxygen connection. This cannon plug connection that is thought to have caused this fire carries a very high voltage, and, if disconnected, could cause a very hot arc.

2. That the fire burned with such an intensity that the control cables evidently were severed and caused the a/c to go out of control.

3. That the crew discipline aboard the plane was very poor just before the fire was discovered is evident. Part of the crew being in the radio room with no men in the waist or tail section is definitely against SOP and repeated instructions against same. Had there been a member, or members of the crew in the waist, the fire would have been noticed sooner and could possibly have been put out. At least, enough warning could have been given to allow all the occupants to escape. Also, it is believed that at least two (2) members of the crew had their parachutes in the waist section of the A/C and could not get to them because of the fire.

4. That the accident be attributed to 50% material failure and 50% personnel failure on the part of the crew members who were not at their proper stations, this responsibility resting entirely upon the pilot, of course.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
That crew discipline be stressed more closely. At least one member of the crew should be in the waist position at all times. This accident again brings out the much heralded expression, "A mission is not complete until the a/c is parked in the hardstand". This crew had gathered in the radio room to congratulate each other on the successful completion of their tour (most of them were on their last mission), and were generally not concerned with this, the last leg of their mission. Had they been on the alert and in their proper positions the outcome probably would not have spelled, "Disaster".