LT SNEDEKER E-BLD-3
HEADQUARTERS
486TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)
Office of the Operations Officer
MISSION ANALYSIS REPORT
 
I. Planning
DATE: 7 March 45 GP MSSN NBR: 159
TARGET: (P) Deazol Plant, Castrop-Bauxel, Germany
ALERTED AT:1850 BOMB LOAD REC'D AT: 2235
WG AWO REC'D AT: 2345 WG F/O REC'D AT: 0315
DIV F/O REC'D AT: 0145 ZERO HOUR: 0900
FORCE REQUIRED: One (1) group of four (4) squadrons
FORCE FURNISHED BY SQUADRON (PLANNED AND ACTUAL):
  832nd 833rd 834th 835th Total
Crews 12 (13) 12 (12) 12 (13) 3 (3) 39 (41)
A/C 10 (11) 7 (7) 11 (11) 11 (12) 39 (41)
AIR LEADER: COL Overing (Group Lead)
PARTICIPATING STAFF:
(1) COL Burns (Dep Gp Ld, Ld-Hi Sq)
(2) CAPT Simpson (Ld-Lo Sq)
(3) LT Hodges (Ld Diamond Sq)
(4) MAJ McGruder (pass.)		 LEAD CREWS:
(1) Howard (Gp-Ld)
(2) Hunter (Dep Ld-lo Sq)
(3) Warmack (Gp Dep Ld, Ld-Hi Sq)
(4) Shaw (Dep Ld-Hi Sq)
(5) Raddatz (Ld-Lo Sq)
(6) Patteson (Dep Ld-Lo Sq)
(7) Dibble (Ld-Lo-Lo Sq)
(8) Patteson (Dep Ld-Lo-Lo Sq)
BRIEFING OFFICER: CAPT Whitney BRIEFING TIME: 0400
BOMB BRIEFING: LT Zabawa NAV BRIEFING: LT Tolson
S-2 BRIEFING: LT Carlin BOMBING ALTITUDE: 24,000'
POSITION IN TASK FORCE FORM: 4th "C" Group (eighth gp in div formation)
ESTIMATED TIME OF TAKE-OFF: 0710 RETURN: 1506
ASSEMBLY ALTITUDE:  GP: 20,000'    WG: 20,000'    DIV: 20,000'
REMARKS:
   No major difficulties were encountered in planning today's mission; however, bomb load on lead PFF a/c remained to be the same as that specified for wing a/c. Today's assembly altitude of 20,000' was necessary in order to clear all cloud layers.
   For the second time, the group flow the new four (4) squadron formation. To date, no major difficulties have arisen from this type of formation. However, it is still untried in the face of actual enemy a/c attack, the prime reason for good formation.
II. EXECUTION:
TAKE-OFF:  0810-0856  RUNWAY: 25              WIND: 320° @ 14 MPH.
A/C TAKING OFF.: SQ "A" 10.  SQ "B" 10.  SQ "C" 10.  SQ "D" 11. Total: 41
ASSEMBLY ALTITUDE: GP: 20,000',  WG: 20,000'  DIV 21,000'
ELAPSED TIME OF ASSEMBLY:
Group assembly altitude (20,000') at 0933 and group was formed at 1020 hours.
ASSEMBLY (GP, WG & DIV):
    Group assembly was very slow because most a/c, particularly lead PFF a/c, were slow getting to assembly altitude (20,000'), and once there, were slow pulling into formation because of overloaded a/c at that unusually high assembly level. Also, a/c had difficulty in climbing because of being in middle clouds. Planes were in fair group formation when BUN 22 was departed and upon reaching BUN 16, first point on wing assembly line, good group and individual squadron formation was being flown. At BUN 16, the group was on time and on course, and there made an excellent wing assembly. The balance of the wing route was flown almost according to plan and CP #1 reached one (1) minute late. Division assembly was only fair, as the wing ahead in the Division column could just be seen. Evidently they were ahead of time.
     Other difficulties encountered in group assembly were: 447th Group flew through formation at initial assembly, breaking up group momentarily and adding to the slow assembly. The trailing flare, when let down, would not work therefore, was of no use whatsoever in assisting the forming of the group.
ARRIVED 1ST PT WG ASS'Y LINE: 1023 - on time.
POSITION IN TASK FORCE FORM:4th "C" Group (eighth group in div formation).
DEPARTED CP "1": 1035 - one (1) minute late.
CLIMB TO ALTITUDE (ROUTE IN):
    Climb to bombing altitude was started when BUN 23 was departed (as briefed) at 1029 hours. The enemy coast, CP #2 was reached five (5) minutes late and three (3) miles north of briefed entry point. There was considerable essing enroute in as 4B (487th) made several standard esses, supposedly  to establish proper interval. Route, however, was consistently good. The Pre-IP was passed about one (1) mile to the north and the lead squadron, having difficulty in getting a good beacon definition, notified the high squadron to take over the lead. Other squadrons fanned out, the diamond squadron taking interval ahead of the low squadron because the low lead a/c was having engine trouble and finding it difficult to keep up.
   Because of the high assembly altitude, bombing altitude was reached prior to crossing the enemy territory. The rate of climb averaged out to be approximately 115'/min, a little slow probably because of the lead.
TARGET MANEUVER:
     The IP was passed over by all squadrons with wings level. The high squadron now leading and the lead squadron flying echeloned off to its left. The lead went on to bomb in formation with the high, the diamond squadron coming in second, with the low bring up the rear. Cat and Mouse technique was used on the run, and bombs were away right at mid day - a good show for the run. From all indications, everything went very smoothly in the face of the difficulty experienced, although the bombing didn't seem to bring such good results.
TARGET ATTACKED: (P) Deazol Plan, Castrop-Bauxel, Germany.
TYPE OF BOMBING: Micro-H (Sq formation) TIME OF RELEASE: 1159-1201
NBR A/C OVER TARGET: 40 out of 41
NBR A/C ATTACKING: 39 NBR SORTIES CREDITED GP: 40
TOTAL BOMBS LOADED ON A/C TAKING OFF: 574x500 lb. M-43
DISPOSITION OF BOMBS:
Primary Target (PFF):
Castrop-Bauxel, Germany 546x500 lb. M-43
Total Bombs Jettisoned 14x500 lb. M-43
Total Bombs Returned 14x500 lb. M-43
Total Bombs Loaded on A/C T.O. 574x500 lb. M-43
BOMBING RESULTS:
   Impossible to locate bombs of "A" and "B" squadrons because of cloud cover. There is some ground detail on the photographs of "C" squadron. The area cannot be located on the map. A few of their bombs can be seen but they are obviously not in the target area.
   One photograph from "D" squadron shows a bomb pattern. This pattern cannot be plotted accurately but they are at least partially and probably well on the target.
RALLY AND ROUTE BACK:
    At the RP, the lead squadron again assumed its normal position. Rally was very good, squadrons getting together well. A descent of 4,000' to 20,000' [sic] was carried out after target and seemed to work very well.
   The withdrawal was approximately as briefed. Descent to minimum altitude was started at 0600E, the group letting down to 10,600', and continuing to base along planned route at this altitude. Flak corridors were on the Rhine and battle lines were made good on route out, and no flak was flushed.
RETURN TO BASE: 1502-1549.
PFF OPERATION:
    Four (4) PFF a/c were scheduled for today's mission. A/C #453 (R/N-Anex) led "A" sq. a/c #073 (R/N-Gilkey) led "B" sq., a/c #132 (R/N-Humphries) led "C" sq and a/c #074 (R/N-Tolliver) led "D" sq.
    (R/N-Anex) "Beacon reception good after take-off. Search and H2X operation good all the way. Deputy lead a/c took over group lead because of a R/N malfunction in the group lead a/c. Beacon returns were dim and broken up. Possible double triggering.
   (R/N-Gikey) N/H equipment worked satisfactorily except for Namur beacon fading. Took over the group lead just before the IP. Two check points were missed due to fading beacon. Synchronization was good on last check point.
   (R/N-Humphries) Set functioned very well on bomb run. Good beacons for general navigation due to partially limited H2X range. All rate checks were called and last one was good. M-H equipment worked satisfactorily.
   (R/N-Tolliver) Set operation was good. All check points were called up to bombs away. Last check point called was good. M-H equipment worked well. Bacon a bit dim at times but strong enough for a successful bomb run.
WEATHER:
    Base at take-off was 10/10 covered with stratocumulus clouds (tops from 5,500' to 10,00'). Surface visibility was from 2-3 miles.
   Route in (over North Sea) and the target was temporarily 10/10 covered with altostratus clouds up to 12,000'. Visibility aloft was unrestricted.
   Base upon return was 7-9/10 covered with layered stratocumulus clouds extending upward from 2,500' to 3,000'. Visibility was approximately 4-5 miles. Free air temperature at bombing altitude was -33°C.
COMMUNICATIONS:
    Communications in general was good. No major difficulties were reported. VHF discipline was good within the wing.
E/A AND FIGHTER SUPPORT:
     Meager to moderate and fairly accurate tracking flak was encountered in the target area. No e/a were sighted, and fighter support was below standard. The high squadron lead reported seeing only eight to ten contrails high and in pairs before the target. Not as briefed, but fighters were probably in the vicinity.
FORMATION:
    Group formation was good. With the exception of individual stragglers, the squadron formations were also good. Three (3) a/c were all reportedly trailing. Wing formation was good.
ABORTIONS (INCLUDING A/C OVER TARGET AND NOT ATTACKING):
A/C NBR SQ REMARKS PILOT SORTIE
937sp 832 defective gasket in #2 gas tank. Wood no
942 sp 832 Personnel error - bombardier flying on right wing of lead a/c claims he did not se lead drop. Returned bombs to base. Dolan Yes
MALFUNCTIONS:
996 834 Attacked target. One (1) 500 lb. bomb dropped late due to faulty A- release. Cooper Yes
EVALUATION OF LEAD CREWS (BY COMMAND PILOT):
PILOT
WARMACK P, N, PPN, B and M/O rated SUP. C/O and R/O reported EX. REMARKS: A very capable crew. (M/O) right course before target.
RADDATZ Entire crew rated EX. REMARKS: Exceptional work on part of all crew members.
DIBBLE P, N, and M/H rated EX. PPN, B and C/O rated VS. REMARKS: (P) could be stronger in anticipation and smoother on turns. (C/O) - could volunteer more information.
HOWARD N, PPN, B, R/O and M/H rated EX.  P and C/O rated VS. REMARKS: (P) needs more instrument time. (C/O) should report more. (R/H) appears weak. intensive training should round him out well.
OFFICER TAIL GUNNER REPORTS:
     (pilots receiving lower than average grades and why)
PILOT SQ

GRADE

REMARKS
SNIDER 832 F Too far out and back.
COOPER 834 F Much too far back.
WALKUP 835 F Trailed too far back.
   (Outstanding performance)
HUNTER 832 EX Excellent position all the way.
DOLAN 832 EX Excellent position all the way.
ELLINGFORD 832 EX Smooth lead
ESTERSOHN 833 EX Excellent position
DAUENHAUER 834 EX Very nice position
GAY 834 EX Steady close position
SUGGESTIONS AND REMARKS BY OTG's:
    Assembly was executed very poorly.
LOSSES: None
III. CONCLUSIONS:
    Possibly with the presence of the wing commander in our high squadron lead a/c our after mission gripes on the overloading of lead PFF a/c may now gain more consideration. Much difficulty was experienced in reaching assembly altitude on today's mission. With full bomb load and additional load of lead a/c, high power settings had to be used to maintain even below SOP rates of climb and airspeed - why doesn't somebody do something?
   The new type squadron formation is very flexible and enables good group formation to be flown. Squadron leaders without the worry of a high flight are able to manipulate and control the squadron under most all circumstances with great ease. However, for good group formation, individual stragglers and lagging elements will have to be eliminated, as they create considerable disturbances and prop wash when the squadrons attempt to pull in good position. The low element of the low squadron particularly, should be impressed with the importance of maintaining good position on the climb as the diamond squadron, although echeloning right, may still have trouble necessarily falling out of position. Better formation should be flown over the target as planes are spreading out, whereas the I should be the signal for all a/c to really tuck it in.
   It would seem that more definite signals should be required of the lead a/c at the IP and at bombs away. The wing men of the lead plane now fly stacked up, and supposedly are unable to see bomb bys of lead a/c sufficiently to tell when doors are opened. At time of bombs away, they cannot see the smoke bombs or the release of bombs, and the air leader probably should be instructed to announce over VHF that his squadron has dropped. As in additional precautionary measure, a flare could be fired which would definitely indicate bombs away. All reasonable measures to insure more bombs on the target would seem to be justified, despite the slight burden involved.
   The bombardier on a/c #942 went over the target but as in such a position that he failed to see bombs away of the lead a/c or any other a/c in the formation. According to the bombardiers statement, he was waiting on VHF for the signal to release bombs. A thorough  investigation has been made as to the reason for this gross error - whether the responsibility can be placed on the bombardier alone, on the entire crew or otherwise. An a/c over the target, not attacking, deserves much more investigation than was initiated in this case.
   The repetition of these instances of aircraft failing to attack for seemingly insignificant reasons is something which should be corrected at the earliest possible moment.
   With the influx of new crews and the present increase tempo of operational missions, this problem will become more and more acute. One answer to this particular problem might be a more extensive training program for new crews on the fundamental problems of operational fling. From the appearance of some of the abortion reports received lately, it would seem that many of those simpler problems have been overlooked in the past.
   The mission was well executed in all respects. The high squadron did an excellent job of assuming the lead at the IP, enabling the leas squadron to echelon left and drop bombs off the release. Good group and squadron formations were flown.
 

For the Commanding Officer:
 
James F. Gardenhire
Major, Air Corps,
Adjutant

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